Firms, contracts, and financial structure /
This book provides a framework for thinking about economic institutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Book |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Oxford :
Clarednon Press,
1995
Oxford : New York : Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1995 Oxford [England] : New York : 1995 Oxford : New York : 1995 |
Series: | Clarendon lectures in economics
Clarendon lectures in economics |
Subjects: |
Internet
Stanford University
Call Number: |
HB241 .H354 1995 |
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Yale University
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HB241 H354X 1995 (LC) |
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University of Chicago
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HB241.H3540 1995 |
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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HB241.H354 1995 |
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Johns Hopkins University
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HB 241 .H3541 1995 |
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Harvard University
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HB 241 .H354 1995 HB241 .H354 1995 |
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HB241 .H354 1995 |
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Cornell University
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HB241 .H354x 1995 |
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University of Pennsylvania
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HB241 .H354 1995 |
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Brown University
Call Number: |
HB241 .H354 1995 |
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