Organizational design : decision rights and incentive contacts / Susan Athey [and] John Roberts
We explore the interaction between the allocation of decision rights over investment opportunities and the design of incentive contracts to induce unobservable effort in a multiagent, multitasking agency framework. These are linked in our model because the only available performance measures confoun...
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
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Cambridge, MA :
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics,
[2001]
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| Series: | Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics) ;
no. 01-12 |
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Internet
This item is not available through BorrowDirect. Please contact your institution’s interlibrary loan office for further assistance.Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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HB31.M415 no.01-12 |
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