The mirror of the world : subjects, consciousness, and self-consciousness /

The mirror of the world : subjects, consciousness, and self-consciousness /

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Christopher Peacocke presents a philosophical theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation of such a subject of consciousness. He develops a new treatment of subjects, distinct from previous theories, under which subjects were regarded eith...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Peacocke, Christopher (Author, http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut)
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2014
Oxford ; New York : 2014
Edition:First edition
Series:Context and content
Subjects:
Consciousness
Self (Philosophy)
Self-consciousness (Awareness)
Self-knowledge, Theory of
Subject (Philosophy)
Bewusstsein
Jaget > teori, filosofi
Medvetandefilosofi
Medvetandet
Philosophie
Selbst
Selbstbewusstsein
Selbsterkenntnis
Självuppfattning > teori, filosofi
Subjekt
Bewustzijn
Subject (filosofie)
Zelf
Zelfbewustzijn
Table of Contents:
  • Primitive self-representation
  • The metaphysics of conscious subjects
  • The first person concept and its nonconceptual parent
  • Explaining first person phenomena
  • Descartes defended
  • Paralogisms and first person illusions
  • Perspectival self-consciousness
  • Reflective self-consciousness
  • Interpersonal self-consciousness
  • Open conclusion : the place of metaphysics
  • note: I Introduction
  • II. Primitive Self-Representation
  • 1. Basic Notion
  • 2. Self-Files
  • 3. Three Degrees of Self-Representation
  • III. Metaphysics of Conscious Subjects
  • 1. Consciousness and Conscious Subjects: An Interdependence
  • 2. Response to Hume
  • 3. Consequences of Interdependence
  • 4. Contemporary Differences: A Historical Affinity
  • IV. First Person Concept and its Nonconceptual Parent
  • 1. Some Background on Concepts
  • 2. Explaining Four Phenomena
  • 3. Issues of Acquaintance
  • V. Explaining First Person Phenomena
  • 1. Explaining Immunity to Error through Misidentification
  • 2. Can We Dispense with First Person Notions and Concepts?
  • VI. Descartes Defended
  • 1. Soundness of the Cogito
  • 2. What Can the Perspective of Consciousness Supply?
  • 3. Entitlement, the Second Cogito, and Anscombe
  • VII. Paralogisms and First Person Illusions
  • 1. Issues
  • 2. Some Replies to Kant's Objections
  • 3. Strawson's Neo-Kantian Conception of Subjects
  • VIII. Perspectival Self-Consciousness
  • 1. What is the Significance of the Mirror Test?
  • 2. Wider Criterion for Perspectival Self-Consciousness
  • 3. Reorientation Account and Other Minds
  • IX. Reflective Self-Consciousness
  • 1. Characterizing Reflective Self-Consciousness
  • 2. Metaphysics and Epistemology of Reflective Self-Consciousness
  • 3. First Person Theories of Understanding, and Empirical Phenomena
  • 4. Reflective and Perspectival Self-Consciousness: Their Significance for Inquiry
  • 5. Reflective Self-Consciousness and the Conception of Many Minds
  • X. Interpersonal Self-Consciousness
  • 1. Illustration and Delineation
  • 2. Some Roles of Interpersonal Self-Consciousness
  • 3. Is There an Irreducible Second Person Concept?
  • 4. Philosophical and Psychological Issues
  • 5. Self-Consciousness: The Relations of the Interpersonal to Other Varieties
  • 6. Concluding Remarks
  • Appendix A
  • Appendix B
  • XI. Open Conclusion: The Place of Metaphysics.
  • I Introduction 1
  • II Primitive Self-Representation 6
  • 1 The Basic Notion 6
  • 2 Self-Files 14
  • 3 Three Degrees of Self-Representation 30
  • III The Metaphysics of Conscious Subjects 40
  • 1 Consciousness and Conscious Subjects: An Interdependence 40
  • 2 A Response to Hume 44
  • 3 The Consequences of Interdependence 57
  • 4 Contemporary Differences: A Historical Affinity 68
  • IV The First Person Concept and its Nonconceptual Parent 80
  • 1 Some Background on Concepts 81
  • 2 Explaining Four Phenomena 86
  • 3 Issues of Acquaintance 99
  • V Explaining First Person Phenomena 106
  • 1 Explaining Immunity to Error through Misidentification 106
  • 2 Can We Dispense with First Person Notions and Concepts? 113
  • VI Descartes Defended 127
  • 1 The Soundness of the Cogito 128
  • 2 What Can the Perspective of Consciousness Supply? 139
  • 3 Entitlement, the Second Cogito, and Anscombe 146
  • VII Paralogisms and First Person Illusions 154
  • 1 The Issues 154
  • 2 Some Replies to Kant's Objections 159
  • 3 Strawson's Neo-Kantian Conception of Subjects 178
  • VIII Perspectival Self-Consciousness 188
  • 1 What is the Significance of the Mirror Test? 190
  • 2 A Wider Criterion for Perspectival Self-Consciousness 194
  • 3 The Reorientation Account and Other Minds 203
  • IX Reflective Self-Consciousness 213
  • 1 Characterizing Reflective Self-Consciousness 213
  • 2 Metaphysics and Epistemology of Reflective Self-Consciousness 217
  • 3 First Person Theories of Understanding, and Empirical Phenomena 223
  • 4 Reflective and Perspectival Self-Consciousness: Their Significance for Inquiry 232
  • 5 Reflective Self-Consciousness and the Conception of Many Minds 234
  • X Interpersonal Self-Consciousness 236
  • 1 Illustration and Delineation 237
  • 2 Some Roles of Interpersonal Self-Consciousness 243
  • 3 Is There an Irreducible Second Person Concept? 247
  • 4 Philosophical and Psychological Issues 250
  • 5 Self-Consciousness: The Relations of the Interpersonal to Other Varieties 260
  • 6 Concluding Remarks 263
  • Appendix A 264
  • Appendix B 266
  • XI Open Conclusion: The Place of Metaphysics 267

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