The mirror of the world : subjects, consciousness, and self-consciousness /
Christopher Peacocke presents a philosophical theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation of such a subject of consciousness. He develops a new treatment of subjects, distinct from previous theories, under which subjects were regarded eith...
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Format: | Book |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Oxford :
Oxford University Press,
2014
Oxford ; New York : 2014 |
Edition: | First edition |
Series: | Context and content
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Subjects: |
Table of Contents:
- Primitive self-representation
- The metaphysics of conscious subjects
- The first person concept and its nonconceptual parent
- Explaining first person phenomena
- Descartes defended
- Paralogisms and first person illusions
- Perspectival self-consciousness
- Reflective self-consciousness
- Interpersonal self-consciousness
- Open conclusion : the place of metaphysics
- note: I Introduction
- II. Primitive Self-Representation
- 1. Basic Notion
- 2. Self-Files
- 3. Three Degrees of Self-Representation
- III. Metaphysics of Conscious Subjects
- 1. Consciousness and Conscious Subjects: An Interdependence
- 2. Response to Hume
- 3. Consequences of Interdependence
- 4. Contemporary Differences: A Historical Affinity
- IV. First Person Concept and its Nonconceptual Parent
- 1. Some Background on Concepts
- 2. Explaining Four Phenomena
- 3. Issues of Acquaintance
- V. Explaining First Person Phenomena
- 1. Explaining Immunity to Error through Misidentification
- 2. Can We Dispense with First Person Notions and Concepts?
- VI. Descartes Defended
- 1. Soundness of the Cogito
- 2. What Can the Perspective of Consciousness Supply?
- 3. Entitlement, the Second Cogito, and Anscombe
- VII. Paralogisms and First Person Illusions
- 1. Issues
- 2. Some Replies to Kant's Objections
- 3. Strawson's Neo-Kantian Conception of Subjects
- VIII. Perspectival Self-Consciousness
- 1. What is the Significance of the Mirror Test?
- 2. Wider Criterion for Perspectival Self-Consciousness
- 3. Reorientation Account and Other Minds
- IX. Reflective Self-Consciousness
- 1. Characterizing Reflective Self-Consciousness
- 2. Metaphysics and Epistemology of Reflective Self-Consciousness
- 3. First Person Theories of Understanding, and Empirical Phenomena
- 4. Reflective and Perspectival Self-Consciousness: Their Significance for Inquiry
- 5. Reflective Self-Consciousness and the Conception of Many Minds
- X. Interpersonal Self-Consciousness
- 1. Illustration and Delineation
- 2. Some Roles of Interpersonal Self-Consciousness
- 3. Is There an Irreducible Second Person Concept?
- 4. Philosophical and Psychological Issues
- 5. Self-Consciousness: The Relations of the Interpersonal to Other Varieties
- 6. Concluding Remarks
- Appendix A
- Appendix B
- XI. Open Conclusion: The Place of Metaphysics.
- I Introduction 1
- II Primitive Self-Representation 6
- 1 The Basic Notion 6
- 2 Self-Files 14
- 3 Three Degrees of Self-Representation 30
- III The Metaphysics of Conscious Subjects 40
- 1 Consciousness and Conscious Subjects: An Interdependence 40
- 2 A Response to Hume 44
- 3 The Consequences of Interdependence 57
- 4 Contemporary Differences: A Historical Affinity 68
- IV The First Person Concept and its Nonconceptual Parent 80
- 1 Some Background on Concepts 81
- 2 Explaining Four Phenomena 86
- 3 Issues of Acquaintance 99
- V Explaining First Person Phenomena 106
- 1 Explaining Immunity to Error through Misidentification 106
- 2 Can We Dispense with First Person Notions and Concepts? 113
- VI Descartes Defended 127
- 1 The Soundness of the Cogito 128
- 2 What Can the Perspective of Consciousness Supply? 139
- 3 Entitlement, the Second Cogito, and Anscombe 146
- VII Paralogisms and First Person Illusions 154
- 1 The Issues 154
- 2 Some Replies to Kant's Objections 159
- 3 Strawson's Neo-Kantian Conception of Subjects 178
- VIII Perspectival Self-Consciousness 188
- 1 What is the Significance of the Mirror Test? 190
- 2 A Wider Criterion for Perspectival Self-Consciousness 194
- 3 The Reorientation Account and Other Minds 203
- IX Reflective Self-Consciousness 213
- 1 Characterizing Reflective Self-Consciousness 213
- 2 Metaphysics and Epistemology of Reflective Self-Consciousness 217
- 3 First Person Theories of Understanding, and Empirical Phenomena 223
- 4 Reflective and Perspectival Self-Consciousness: Their Significance for Inquiry 232
- 5 Reflective Self-Consciousness and the Conception of Many Minds 234
- X Interpersonal Self-Consciousness 236
- 1 Illustration and Delineation 237
- 2 Some Roles of Interpersonal Self-Consciousness 243
- 3 Is There an Irreducible Second Person Concept? 247
- 4 Philosophical and Psychological Issues 250
- 5 Self-Consciousness: The Relations of the Interpersonal to Other Varieties 260
- 6 Concluding Remarks 263
- Appendix A 264
- Appendix B 266
- XI Open Conclusion: The Place of Metaphysics 267