Domain conditions and social rationality /
This book primarily focuses on the domain conditions under which a number of important classes of binary social decision rules give rise to rational social preferences. One implication of the Arrow and Gibbard theorems is that every non-oligarchic social decision rule that satisfies the condition of...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Singapore :
Springer,
2019
|
| Subjects: |
Table of Contents:
- Chapter 1. Introduction
- Chapter 2. The Preliminaries
- Chapter 3. The Method of Majority Decision
- Chapter 4. The Strict Majority Rule
- Chapter 5. The Class of Semi-Strict Majority Rules
- Chapter 6. Special Majority Rules
- Chapter 7. The Class of Strict Majority Rules
- Chapter 8. The Class of Pareto-Inclusive Strict Majority Rules
- Chapter 9. Social Decision Rules Which Are Simple Games
- Chapter 10. Neutral and Monotonic Binary Social Decision Rules
- Chapter 11. Quasi-Transitive Individual Preferences
- Chapter 12. Summary and Concluding Remarks